

~~TOP SECRET~~

AD HOC IAC COMMITTEE (WATCH)

Transcript of Meeting Held in Director's  
Conference Room, Administration Building  
Central Intelligence Agency, on 8 January 1954

T-9

Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Office of the Special Assistant,  
Intelligence, Department of State

Brigadier General John M. Willems, Deputy AC of S, G-2,  
Department of the Army

Captain D. T. Eller (USN), Assistant Head, Intelligence  
Branch, ONI, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, Deputy Director Intelli-  
gence, Headquarters USAF, United States Air Force

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Intelligence Division, Atomic  
Energy Commission

Colonel Neil M. Wallace, Joint Intelligence Group, The  
Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Special Agent, Liaison Section,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel Howard D. Kenzie, United States Air Force

Lt. Col. James P. Barry, G-2, Department of the Army

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

25X1A [REDACTED] Secretary

25X1A [REDACTED] Reporter

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TOP SECRET

MR. SHELDON: Well, gentlemen, I hope we are all in a forward going mood here. Let's see if we can move along in good order. Any comments on the last Minutes as circulated?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I have a correction that Dr. McKee asked me to present. On page 3 of the Minutes at his last statement there he doesn't know whether he misspoke himself or whether he was misunderstood, but he would like to have the last line of his statement in the Minutes deleted so that his final sentence there reads: "He said that concern with actions, or activities, that might undesirably affect the welfare of the country would involve too broad a field but that the committee should expand its consideration beyond strictly military limits." Even now he admits that we are not considering or are not within strictly military limits.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is a most acceptable amendment.

MR. TRUEHEART: Really dropped "which now governed its activities"?

MR. SHELDON: That is right. Are there any other corrections?

COLONEL WALLACE: Simply a typographical error at the next to the last word at the last page . . . I beg your pardon, page 6, the word "broad". There is just a reverse of the two letters there.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, I have mine marked. Right. Anything else? The Minutes will stand as circulated with the amendments accepted in today's meeting.

Just to start with a clean piece of paper for the new year, we had prepared what we believe to be the status of how far we have gotten today. In other words, recognizing that the paper is tentative, we thought we might as well start with a clean sheet and go on from there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I had done exactly the same thing. I found I couldn't really find where it was.

MR. SHELDON: Yes. During the holidays I ran across in The Washington Post a leading article which probably many of you also saw. It kind of underscores the importance of this Committee. One of the phrases is:

TOP SECRET

If more emphasis on the continental early warning system would bring even two hours' notice, it might make the difference between effective air defense and destruction of strategic planes on the ground.

That is an article which appeared on the 4th of January in The Washington Post, and the title of it is "Safeguarding SAC," but it particularly referred to the early warning problem and underscored it. I just thought I would mention that.

Now I think we have to decide whether we want to go back and tidy up or whether we want to go forward and attack the balance of the problems which confront the Committee. My personal suggestion would be that it would be preferable to go forward and leave the tidying up to a later date. How do you feel about that?

Just for a second to review it before we go on, just to review the areas where we will have to go back and really tidy up. We still haven't completely solved the military-paramilitary aspects of the mission, although we have made a considerable step forward at the last meeting. I assume that there may be some changes desirable in the Preamble, but I also class that in the tidying up category. Naturally what we say in the Mission paragraph will have to be carried over under the Functions. In other words, there may be some language changes there to conform, but by and large those seem to me to be the two areas where the major tidying up is necessary, so that in effect we have reached a point where we should talk about and if possible decide on how the Indications Center shall be operated. At least that is my understanding of about the position we have reached now.

At an earlier meeting was submitted to us the G-2 concept of how the Indications Center would be operated. General Willems submitted a paper which we did not discuss in detail. Do you have that in front of you? It starts out "The Watch Committee will maintain an Indications Center which will", and then we go from a to i. Do we all have that with us?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Those were put out in the Minutes, weren't they?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

COLONEL WALLACE: Which meeting was it?

MR. SHELDON: Frank, do you recall the date of that?

TOP SECRET

GENERAL WILLEMS: It was the 11th of December.

MR. TRUEHEART: Minutes 7.

MR. SHELDON: It would seem to me appropriate that we should tackle that paper and go at it paragraph by paragraph unless anybody has any serious objection to that. Is that what the Committee wishes to do?

25X1A [REDACTED] I have a couple of extra copies of those Minutes if anybody doesn't have it.

MR. KUHRITZ: I will take one. Thank you.

MR. SHELDON: How do we feel on a? Any comments on a?

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, I have one comment on the word "functions" there, the last word. It might be that you mean "mission" instead of "functions". The mission is a little broader term, and that would be what . . . relative to the mission would be really what . . .

MR. SHELDON: I have no objection to that. Does anybody?

MR. TRUEHEART: "mission"?

MR. SHELDON: Does it bother you, Bill?

MR. TRUEHEART: Not the mission, no. I was frowning at the three words here "continuously screen all". Does that "continuously" mean 24 hours a day?

MR. SHELDON: Sure, why not?

MR. TRUEHEART: I wanted just to ask the question. Does it mean that? Do we have a three-shift operation here?

MR. SHELDON: Well, I don't think that is necessarily implied.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, it would depend on the situation, wouldn't it?

MR. SHELDON: It might have to at some point, but I hope that never occurs, but . . . I mean if we are going to call this a watch function, you can't just watch part of the time. It is implicit, I think, that you continuously watch whether physically you have three shifts or one, and a Special Duty Officer, or whatever the proper technique is. You are in effect screening whether it is a staff screening or whether one individual is screening. That function is inherent in a watch function. And if you didn't say continually, what would you say . . . certainly not from time to time, I trust.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: No.

COLONEL WALLACE: It seems to me if an Indications Center is set up it will operate on certain hours as directed by the proper authority, and if a critical situation seems to be developing, we might be told to go on a 24-hour basis, and for a general directive type paper like that I should think the word "continuously" here would be adequate.

MR. SHELDON: I think it is inherent in the function.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't think I raise any objection to it.

MR. SHELDON: All right, that settles a. then.

MR. TRUEHEART: No, but the "all". I still want to talk about the "all". Do we mean by this, and most of this is just clarifying in my own mind what is intended here . . . do we mean by this that . . . well, of course, the word "pertinent" is the key to it, I guess. You do mean a selected body of material?

MR. SHELDON: It can't be otherwise. Otherwise you would completely usurp the functions of all of the intelligence agencies in the community. It has to be selective. I think the word "pertinent" is that all right?

MR. TRUEHEART: I wonder if we shouldn't in that case say instead of "received by" the words "or furnished by all national intelligence agencies"?

MR. SHELDON: Well, isn't it again inherent that it is transmitted to the Indications Center?

MR. TRUEHEART: It is inherent, but I just thought was there any reason why "furnished by" wouldn't be what we are trying to say here? It conforms as I recall to the Functions thing here in the Terms of Reference in C.2., you recall, "furnished by the IAC Agencies".

GENERAL LEWIS: Paragraph c takes care of that, I believe, Bill.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, it does.

GENERAL LEWIS: Look at c down here under this a you were just reading.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it is taken care of there, and I think it is also covered by the Terms of Reference paper. I just don't see why we don't conform this paragraph to the other to what is the clear intent.

MR. SHELDON: What are other people's views on that?

CAPTAIN ELLER: I feel also tie it together and we would be saying

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

the same thing in both sections.

MR. SHELDON: Does anybody have any objection to the word "furnished" in substitution for "received"?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I rather favor the "received" here, and maybe I am being inconsistent here, but here we are talking about the functions of the individuals in this Watch Secretariat or Working Group. One of the things we have tried to do is point up the fact that they must be active in acquiring all of the indications that come in to their agencies. To me this sort of continues to point that up. Really if I had my choice I would rather see us leave "received" in here in this place.

MR. SHELDON: Reading this subjectively in the sense that it puts an additional and quite proper responsibility on the staff of the Indications Center to see to it that there is a constant stream and nothing is omitted from the flow.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, these are the instructions that the Working Group should read carefully and follow.

MR. SHELDON: That is right.

MR. TRUEHEART: But I think the most they are going to screen is what they get under c., as General Lewis says, and that is the place to --

MR. SHELDON: They have got to holler too. It is not a passive function. It is an active function.

GENERAL LEWIS: I agree with you, General Willems. I think it is a good idea to make it clear that there is a close tie-in there and that they can't just sit there on their haunches and wait, and they have to get together with the Home Office and help stimulate the flow of this stuff. I agree. I rather prefer "received" myself.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I will be glad to give in to that.

MR. SHELDON: I think the majority is in favor of "received". All right, b. then. One question arises in my mind on b., and that is it depends to some extent on the strength which we are going to be able to afford to put into the Indications Center. If we have adequate strength, and I hope we will be able to do that, there would be an evaluating function inherently in that

TOP SECRET

staff per se it would seem to me, and I would like, if possible, to get the thought in that while they would get evaluations from the Home Office, so to speak, that the Staff itself should be sufficiently substantively competent also to engage in the evaluating techniques, here again referring to the fact that it is an active function rather than a function of a more passive nature. In other words, if every time something comes in you immediately call up the Home Office so to speak, or run over there, or ask somebody to come over and talk to you, you are not doing the job on the spot to the maximum extent that I think is desirable.

DR. REICHARDT: I was wondering in that line whether the request should not imply or perhaps be changed to some term which would indicate coordinate, a coordinating thing which would cover your thing at the same time and not leave it open because I think --

MR. SHELDON: How about something like develop promptly? You develop an evaluation. Whether you do it yourself or whether you ask for help in the developing of it, you achieve an evaluation. It is that thought I am trying to get in here where the substantive personnel of the Center would be able to take the initiative be it on their own hook or be it assistance from the Home Office.

DR. REICHARDT: Perhaps we might, getting the two thoughts in, "develop promptly through coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with."

MR. SHELDON: That is the idea. The word "request" per se to my mind is a little passive and not quite active enough.

DR. REICHARDT: I would see a danger in some fields at least in allowing a group a chance of interpretation in which they do the evaluation alone. I mean this has happened in my own field to some extent. People have come up with things which for one reason or another have had to be squashed a little bit because they have tended to go overboard.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we want to prevent that to be sure.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I like your wording, Dr. Reichardt.

DR. REICHARDT: I mean, in other words, following your thing I wasn't

TOP SECRET

completely happy with "request" either -- "develop promptly, etc., all reported indications in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies." I throw this open as a suggestion again.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is constructive. How do you feel?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: Would you read it?

DR. REICHARDT: "Develop promptly" . . . I haven't thought this out . . . "an early evaluation analysis of all reported indications in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field, etc."

MR. SHELDON: I would buy that.

DR. REICHARDT: I think that reads all right. Now the thing that bothers, again you see you are getting back to the problem you had before in this word "reported" that we were discussing pertinent to c., "receive" and "furnished", etc. In this light to my own idea, and it is my own sort of conception of the Indications Center, it has been that, and I am not sure that this can work operationally, but just something that I have in the back of my mind, is that the people in the Center would also -- this is also more or less in line with Mr. Trueheart's suggestion -- be a part of their own Center, so they would actually have two homes and would act as a . . . well, I hesitate to use courier, liaison officer, but act as a channel, just a means of coordination between the two so that all of the information in the Agency gets to the Center and that the leads of the Center get back informally to the Agency without having to go up and down there; in other words, it is just a little bit more than just liaison function.

MR. SHELDON: You are thinking of it in terms of an extension in your particular case, an extension of your office?

DR. REICHARDT: That is right. This has been my own feeling, and I got somewhat the same idea from Mr. Trueheart, somewhat in the same line that he anticipated that these people would have two dual roles.

MR. SHELDON: Well, my own view is that there must be continuous interchange of opinions, ideas, and policy as between the individuals working in

TOP SECRET



the Center and their home offices; however, if it is a shuttle game, it is less desirable and it would be simply a question of lack of personnel rather than anything else that would require that.

DR. REICHARDT: I wasn't thinking necessarily of a shuttle game, but in my case, and my example would be a little bit more literal, but in the other cases at least one of the members of both, one of the members on the team from any one particular agency in the Center would also have the dual role there. This can be the top man, or it can be two. I mean one, or two, or more depending on the number of people in your . . . Again I am not . . . and this was just my own feeling on it. We have not discussed this operation. I just mentioned it, so with that background the "reported" seems to be out of context with "received by" and the question Bill and Captain Eller raised.

MR. SHELDON: Is the word "available" any help there?

DR. REICHARDT: I leave it to the rest of the people. I have said too much already.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not sure I understand where you are.

MR. SHELDON: On line 2,b.

DR. REICHARDT: Line 2,b, "all reported indications", you see. I mean following through your thought on "furnished", "received", etc.

MR. SHELDON: The word "available" might have some use there on the theory that it has also the implication of depth; in other words, something may come along which triggers a whole file of material, the file being available, and then you go forward with an evaluation of the entire material available as a result of a new piece of evidence or a new item coming in which acts as a catalyst to previous items which have not taken shape so to speak.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, that word occurs throughout -- "furnished by", "received by" -- and it has caused trouble each time. Now we accepted it under a., but with reservation on my part because we are saying there very clearly "continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all National agencies." In other words, we are saying something which we have agreed that we don't quite mean, I feel. In other words, we are using a statement to indicate that this particular group in the Indications

Center will be energetic in getting the necessary information. I think we would be better to state it a little more along the line of 2,c and then indicate in a statement here that they would actively pursue and insure that the necessary information was furnished -- something along that line.

MR. SHELDON: How would you propose it read then?

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, I was still back on a. there.

MR. TRUEHEART: You have the language and the Terms of reference?

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, which goes back to 2,c, but I would have no objection to putting another statement in here to indicate that it should be an aggressive effort on the part of the Indications Center people to insure that the important function was not allowed to sit idly by and rest.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't understand what the objection is to a.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, we tell them to "continuously screen" -- that means on a 24-hour basis -- "all pertinent intelligence," which is very broad. And then we don't say "received from all National agencies." We say, "received by". In other words, every word in there is extremely broad in its directions to what I have considered up to this point as a group rather small in size.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would think you could interpret that to mean that somebody from the Center ought to be sitting around in every Message Center reading everything that came in to see what was pertinent that came in.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, we are saying that, and it could be almost directed at any time.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't think that is what was intended, and I wouldn't get that out of reading this. I would like to say this that a. represents an attempt that results from experience to try to force all of the agencies to provide all of the pertinent indications which we are not getting today. The Watch Committee is stymied because it doesn't get all of the indications that come into the intelligence agencies in Washington. I think we ought to insure that that committee that we set up does receive them because again to say something self-evident, there are a number of indications that may not to one agency have the ultimate significance. It is dangerous to permit the present system to continue I think.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, I thought in our paragraph 2,c we went around, you

TOP SECRET

know, at some length, and it seemed to me that that is one of the key points in the functioning of the Watch and the supporting committee.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, we have to translate it seems to me. Here we are going to come out with the instructions as to what the Indications Center will do. We have to translate the functions into more definite and clear-cut instructions to the Working Group.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't see how just by this word you will accomplish what you are talking about, but, as I said before, I don't object to the "received by". I think it is a pity really not to follow the language we have in the Terms of Reference or to conform the one with the other, either put this language in the Terms of Reference . . . because I can see that this will raise questions for the future when people start reading this . . . which did they mean, "received by" or "furnished by"? In one place they say "furnished by" and in the other they say "received by". For the same reason I don't like this phrase, "National intelligence agencies". I think we ought to go back to IAC agencies wherever this occurs because that means something very specific whereas National intelligence agencies is not a word of . . . It might mean the Bureau of Narcotics for all I know. It might include them.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I sure wouldn't object.

MR. SHELDON: I think I agree with that aspect of it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, and I agree that this one word in here is not going to accomplish, but what we were trying to do was to keep the whole tenor of our comments here along that line. It isn't just in this one paragraph that we carry that thought.

MR. TRUEHEART: c. is the paragraph in which you lay down an injunction on the Center to get out and make arrangements to get the information you need from the intelligence agencies.

DR. REICHARDT: To get around my problem so I can get out from under on this thing a little bit, why don't we just drop the "reported" in the second line of b. or, if necessary, substitute by the word such as "significant"?

GENERAL WILLEMS: How about "acquired" -- "all acquired indications"?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DR. REICHARDT: "Acquired". Of course, "acquired" goes back to you . . . reflects on your "received" and "furnished by" too, and I was trying to either clarify it or remove that problem completely. I mean it seems we are just adding one more. Here is at least one case where we can probably get out from under the difficulty of "received" and "furnished by" in b., that is, you see.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Unless we do want to. We have attempted to keep reiterating this approach.

MR. SHELDON: I think acquired is a good solution to that. It has the connotation of both receiving and furnishing, and I think that is a happy solution. Will you buy that, Bill?

MR. TRUEHEART: In a. or b.?

MR. SHELDON: b.

MR. TRUEHEART: "all acquired indications"?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't object. It doesn't sound very well somehow to me; I should think of acquired characteristics or something like --

GENERAL WILLEMS: What national document have you been working on? Your ear is tuned to something on a very high level.

MR. TRUEHEART: Where I think the "acquired" would really be a good compromise is in this a. -- "information acquired from all National intelligence agencies" or "all IAC agencies". That has the active sense.

MR. SHELDON: That is altogether too passive for my money. Don't we in any event want to take an "s" off of "belongs"?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think that is rather awkwardly phrased. After you read it enough it sounds . . . "to deal with the field" . . . "the field of intelligence".

MR. SHELDON: Technically --

MR. TRUEHEART: The "s" comes off of "indications" does it not?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I think that would be --

MR. SHELDON: I have to get one of those s's out of there.

TOP SECRET

COLONEL WALLACE: Or else off the "belongs". One or the other. You have a plural in the first place. You ought to knock it off the "belongs" I would think.

MR. SHELDON: I think "the indications belong" is right.

DR. REICHARDT: I mean the "reported" just bothers me a little bit because who is doing the reporting? In fact, who is doing the acquired? I just wonder why we worry except for the emphasis which General Willems wants to place on the receiving of intelligence. I mean it is just a little out of context here.

MR. SHELDON: We are back on "reported"?

DR. REICHARDT: Back on "reported".

MR. SHELDON: I thought we had put in "acquired" for the time being.

DR. REICHARDT: Even with "acquired" -- "reported" or "acquired" -- it just . . . I mean are we . . . ?

MR. SHELDON: Must we qualify that? How about "all indications" because if you haven't got them you can't do anything with them.

MR. TRUEHEART: That suits me.

MR. SHELDON: All right.

DR. REICHARDT: With that I am happy with b.

MR. SHELDON: Now any other comments on b.?

GENERAL WILLEMS: It still reads awkwardly, it seems to me, if you take the "s" off of "indications".

MR. SHELDON: " . . . to which an indication belongs." I think that is an improvement. Are we ready to go on to c.? Or do we want to get back to. . . we want to get back to IAC here, don't we?

COLONEL WALLACE: You mean that is up in a., sir?

MR. SHELDON: No, I am down in c. now. We have the "National Intelligence Agencies" here capitalized in this instance, which we want to put lower case to I assume. Do we have to put the word "Intelligence" in when we use IAC? That doesn't seem to me right.

MR. TRUEHEART: What is that?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. SHELDON: It was your point we substituted IAC. You don't like the word "National", and I think quite rightly, so we substituted "received by all IAC". My question is it doesn't seem to me we want to put the word "intelligence" in there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't intend that that should be in IAC agencies.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, and then we make the corresponding change in c.

GENERAL LEWIS: Wait a minute now. Did we put IAC in place of National?

MR. SHELDON: That was the suggestion.

GENERAL LEWIS: Is that right?

MR. SHELDON: Well, the point was raised that what is a National intelligence agency. Does the Bureau of Narcotics fall under that category?

DR. REICHARDT: As I recall, in support of General Lewis, when we were discussing this we meant to in this Center insure that not only the intelligence or information be received by the IAC agencies, but the intelligence or information received by any other National agency not necessarily intelligence should be gotten over.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is all very well. I agree it would be just fine to have everything from everywhere, but as a practical matter we can't legislate for anything but the IAC, and I think we want to consider what is in the New York Times also, but . . .

GENERAL LEWIS: You have to provide for it.

MR. TRUEHEART: You have to provide for it, but --

GENERAL LEWIS: You may not be able to order it, but you can make provision for it, and I don't think this should limit the utilization or the arrangement for intelligence from any source. All departments of the Government may -- and maybe some activities of the Government are not departments -- be able to provide some valuable information, and I don't think you want to limit this to IAC only.

MR. TRUEHEART: Do you want to say "all Government agencies"?

GENERAL LEWIS: I think what you got there is all right. I don't see anything wrong with it. That may even be too narrow if some intelligence activity that has any relationship to the United States Government might not consider themselves national.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, General, I have no wish to limit this if you want to put "all agencies of the Government" or any phrase at all. I just think as a practical matter we ought not to lay down anything in here which we can't deliver on.

GENERAL LEWIS: In a. it says that you screen everything you get from all sources.

MR. TRUEHEART: No, it doesn't say that because we just argued that out. It says we screen everything received by all agencies.

GENERAL LEWIS: All right, received by.

MR. TRUEHEART: So we will screen everything received by the Treasury Department would be what would be meant if we put this thing in the way you say.

GENERAL LEWIS: I am thinking about receiving information from every possible source, and I don't think we ought to limit ourselves to receive it from some and not from all.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But shouldn't that intelligence be acquired through one of the IAC agencies? Aren't we shoving up the Watch Committee a bit too high?

GENERAL LEWIS: In general it would be, but I don't think there is any need for us to specify that it has to be because it may not be. As a matter of fact I believe we are going to find that if we broaden this thing enough we are going to find some activities that are not directly connected with IAC members that can contribute.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But would we want the Watch Committee to go out after that, or would we want some --

GENERAL LEWIS: Probably would, but I don't see any reason for --

MR. TRUEHEART: So it reads "continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information relating to the Watch Committee mission." That doesn't put any limitations on it at all.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I am happy with it the way it is, but I certainly don't want to limit it in any way.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't want it limited, but I don't want terms in here which don't have any meaning such as "National intelligence agencies". I don't know what that means, and I want to have something in here which I do understand. I think that is very important, but I don't want to limit it to IAC agencies if you meant to include other things in here.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I would be willing to take out "National" if you wanted to and say "all".

MR. SHELDON: That is more limiting. Then you still have an intelligence agency as your possible source whereas Commerce might provide something which might be of considerable value.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I presume that any information that is received or that is passed by anybody or received by anybody that an intelligence agency will be actually the one to pass it to you, but maybe that is not so. We maybe ought to say . . . no, I think we are getting away from it. I think we are getting away from it. I think it is probably better to leave it.

MR. KUERTZ: I think the IAC agencies will apply because if you go back to Functions is "to develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an Intelligence Plan for the levying upon IAC members" a collection and priority system which, if there is something in Commerce, develops a plan there for an IAC member to arrange for it. For instance, in the economic field your people will have various controls in Commerce in picking up such data.

MR. SHELDON: In effect your requirements from the Watch Committee or the Indications Center would pass immediately to a member of the IAC who in turn would then do his best to route out any information that was outside of the IAC. That would include [REDACTED] what have you -- all kinds of other material.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, but, of course, your serving of requirements doesn't necessarily cover all of what might be received, you see.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: I personally don't see anything particularly wrong with a.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I think the trouble is that Bill doesn't . . . we

TOP SECRET

25X1C



TOP SECRET

haven't given him a definition of national. I think that is his trouble.

DR. REICHARDT: "National intelligence agencies". My conversation, the way it was developed, I was getting back particularly to what we are down in our Functions paragraph which get back to Bill's suggestion on IAC agencies. If we understand by that that the IAC agencies will be the ones that levy the requirements and make arrangements for screenings in the other agencies such as thought necessary --

MR. KUERTZ: Don't you think it has got to work out that way? The other agencies can't very well be knowledgeable of a Watch Center when you have got Special Intelligence involved there, etc., and that has got to be handled through an IAC agency.

MR. SHELDON: What we are doing is mixing channels and ideas here.

COLONEL WALLACE: I believe somewhere in one of the NSCID papers, NSCID 1 or whichever it is, it provides for any agency other than an IAC member to bring intelligence to the attention, I believe, of CIA, and sometimes the representatives of those other agencies will be called to sit with the IAC when some matter in their pertinent field is being discussed.

MR. SHELDON: I think you are correct on that score. Well, the question is shall we use the word "by all IAC agencies" or shall we leave it "by all National intelligence agencies"? You don't feel inclined to buy "IAC agencies"?

GENERAL LEWIS: That is generally correct, but I don't think it is exclusively so.

MR. SHELDON: You think it is too limiting?

GENERAL LEWIS: When you are talking about receiving information. Now when you get down to c. and say exactly what we are going to arrange specifically for I think that is different.

MR. SHELDON: That is a different question.

MR. TRUEHEART: I have three alternatives any one of which would suit me fine. One is to eliminate this section altogether, that is, from the word "received" through "agencies". It couldn't be broader than that. Secondly, I would be willing to buy just "all agencies" or "all Government agencies". Finally I would be willing to buy "all IAC agencies". Now anything

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

which has a meaning which is understood I will buy, in other words, on this point because I don't think it makes too much difference, but I don't like to put in here a new term, "National intelligence agencies" which, so far as I know, has no definition. Finally I will even buy "National intelligence agencies" if you will put a footnote down here and say what those agencies are.

MR. SHELDON: That couldn't be fairer.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I think we are generally talking about U. S. Government, aren't we?

MR. SHELDON: Well, Bill, I will buy any one of your four.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think I got about six before I got through.

MR. SHELDON: If we are looking for a big basket, then the suggestion to eliminate "received by all intelligence agencies" is the biggest basket. Now does anybody have any objection to a big basket here? It seems to me the bigger our basket the less chance we have of missing an item from the peripheral suppliers of information. I don't see. That can't hurt the functioning of the Indications Center to have a big basket to dip into.

MR. TRUEHEART: It has the added advantage of sticking to one subject in a. You are really getting into two different fields in there.

MR. SHELDON: In c. you are talking about the channels to which you dip into that basket, so it would make perfectly good sense to me to make the basket large in a., and then you indicate how by channelization through IAC you tap those baskets. Do you see any objection to that?

DR. REICHARDT: I think that probably defines what we want.

GENERAL WILLEMS: If I may present another point of approach to this. I am a little concerned at the Charter that we are writing for this Watch Committee when we allow them to indicate that they should seek indications from too broad a group of agencies because then you put a responsibility on the Watch Committee which I don't think they should have. I don't think they should be responsible for acquiring essential intelligence in this field. I think that responsibility rests with the IAC.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. SHELDON: I agree with that, but I think all we are saying is, "Look, this gives the chance of your representative or mine in the Indications Center to say, 'Look, Home Team, there may be some good information outside of the IAC. Please see what you can do to smoke that stuff out.'" All that hasn't put a responsibility, I don't think, on the Staff Member in the Indications Center. It simply permits him to goose the Agency that he comes from.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But it does charge him to a certain degree with looking around and exploring into let's say the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury, the Secret Service, etc.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think it puts an obligation on him to explore except to have an idea there might be something there. "Please look into it for us and see if we really dredged out everything that is pertinent to the problem."

GENERAL WILLEMS: We were sort of getting back the same way when we were deciding the matter of reviewing National intelligence estimates. There is an implied responsibility there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I see your point, General. I think we want to avoid giving the Watch Committee the responsibility for dealing with all agencies in the Government, but don't you do that in c? Can't you cover your point in c? We can't get it all into this paragraph.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, what I am leading up to is you avoid this by tying back into the IAC here and leaving the responsibility for the acquiring of all necessary intelligence with the intelligence agencies. Anything in Commerce that relates to this field it shouldn't be the responsibility of the Watch Committee to ferret it out. It ought to be the responsibility of an agency of IAC.

MR. KUHRIZ: That is right.

MR. SHELDON: I agree with that, but I don't think you put an obligation on a member of the Indications Staff simply by indicating that there is a bigger basket. He then simply asks his Home Agency Chief to look into that basket. It is simply a reminder to be sure that all aspects are covered.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

GENERAL LEWIS: What did you mean by National Intelligence Agencies then as a result of what you just said? Did you mean IAC?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think in substance we did.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think in general you probably did.

GENERAL WILLEMS: It is a common term that we use. I am surprised that there is a question on it. We use it quite commonly over there.

MR. TRUEHEART: What do you mean when you use it? Do you mean IAC agencies?

GENERAL WILLEMS: We mean any U. S. intelligence agency, and all of those intelligence agencies are members of IAC aren't they? If not we ought to get them in.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has an intelligence unit has it not? There are several in the Treasury Department.

MR. SHELDON: FOA has some intelligence bodies on its staff now.

MR. TRUEHEART: Commerce has an intelligence unit; USIA has an intelligence unit.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But they are a National intelligence.

MR. TRUEHEART: They are not IAC members.

GENERAL WILLEMS: They are not gathering intelligence are they?

MR. TRUEHEART: USIA is, for example, as you know, and there are quite a few who are gathering intelligence of one kind or another. It is not necessarily intelligence relating to the national security.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I see what you mean. Perhaps we used the term loosely. That is why I favor IAC frankly. I think there you get back into the field that we are trying --

MR. TRUEHEART: The only trouble I see with IAC is the NSA angle. NSA isn't a member of IAC, but maybe we don't intend that the Center should have any direct take from NSA but only through the agencies.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, doesn't NSA provide a service to us? They shouldn't develop intelligence.

MR. TRUEHEART: As I say, it may be quite right that they are not included here, but I would think it depended in part on whether you expected

TOP SECRET

them to furnish material directly to the Center -- Indications Center -- or whether that you don't always come through the Agency.

GENERAL WILLEMS: You should always come through the agencies.

MR. TRUEHEART: I really think that is the kind of question we ought to deal with in c. and not in a. because I think we are trying to deal with too many things.

MR. SHELDON: I can conceive of another problem here which perhaps wouldn't be covered. We talked earlier about seeing what we could do to tie in world-wide assets to assist in the watch function. Now let us assume for a moment that SAC has certain assets in Europe where it might be desirable to have a direct channel on an alert basis. You then might receive a message from London or Germany. It wouldn't be covered by the definition "IAC" or "National intelligence agencies" unless it passed through A-2 first, and that might be time consuming. It might be desirable to have a direct method of funneling an alert right into the Indications Center.

GENERAL LEWIS: Simultaneous distribution.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, so technically that would not be covered by anything but a bigger basket. Hence in a. it would seem more appropriate to make a bigger basket without I sincerely believe putting any onerous burden on the future staff of the Indications Center. It doesn't seem to me that that is an undue burden. Do you think, Millard?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, the broadest possible . . . as I see it is to change "National" to "U.S. Government" and I think you have got it.

COLONEL WALLACE: Well, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me as if we stick to the IAC wording that we have at the moment in a., we will then have the members of the Indications Center screening this material, and very likely from that at times they may develop or detect a need for intelligence from some of the outside agencies. By that I mean outside of IAC. Their normal day to day work would be the screening of material from their own parent IAC units, and then if they did develop this need or note this need, then they could go back to the IAC and arrange for the securing of that additional

information from an outside agency which could be part of the function to be expressed in paragraph c. here. It would seem to me with a slight rewording perhaps of c. somewhere we could indicate that. The point I am trying to make is I would hate to see the Indications Center be saddled with the job of always looking for things in agencies other than IAC, and we don't have a channel for doing that.

MR. SHELDON: Well, per contra supposing they were to receive a flash from London emanating from a SAC source and they did nothing about it and nothing happened. They still couldn't be charged with not having done their job if you leave a. as it stands today because they would have received something outside of the IAC community. Now that is a little far fetched to be sure.

COLONEL WALLACE: We would not be receiving that. I say we in the Indications Center for a moment. The Indications Center would not be receiving that except through an IAC member source ordinarily, would we?

MR. SHELDON: Well, that is the question I raise. I am not sure that speed of handling it might not be advisable to have simultaneous receipts of messages in Washington in which case --

COLONEL WALLACE: I believe the NSCID I mentioned sometime ago provides that if any non-IAC agency receives any such information of the type you indicate, then it is up to them to bring it to the attention of, I believe, it is the IAC. I don't have that NSCID here before me now.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't think it works quite that way, Colonel.

MR. SHELDON: I mean visualizing an alert situation developing in Germany, and you have an outpost wherever it happens to be there, and you have to get that back to Washington by the most rapid possible means. Now if it has to pass through the CIA Message Center and what have you and then be transmitted to the Indications Center, you have lost valuable minutes if not hours, and you would in effect perhaps not be receiving that from an "IAC source". I am looking --

CAPTAIN ELLER: This is exactly the problem that has puzzled me and bothered me to the degree of attempting to end up with just what we would like

TOP SECRET

to have. For instance, incoming messages from various agencies throughout the world addressed to the Watch Committee Indications Center would set up I would judge, if it was a modest amount, certainly something as large as the Navy has as far as the Communications Center goes, so that it would appear that this Indications Center would with a Communications Center attached to it, unless we are careful in determining just how we would word it, we would end up with a very large organization. If that is the intent.

MR. SHELDON: No, that is not the intent.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I mean if that should be desirable. I feel we are opening the door in our wording here, and if we continue along this line we may arrive at that point. In paragraph C,2 we go back to the basic discussion that it would be material furnished by the IAC agencies which would indicate that the intelligence agencies would do the bulk of the work and bear the big personnel burden in their initial analysis, etc. I just raise that point because it has bothered me in the wording in each one of these paragraphs.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Might we leave a. as it is here somewhat with the modifications that we have indicated and then have another paragraph that develops, you might say, the off chance possibility of dealing with direct -- some direct -- message or some direct indication which has come to the attention of the Watch Committee?

MR. SHELDON: As long as we leave that door open it seems to me it doesn't make much difference how we handle it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: The intent of a. there is this intent to try to indicate the necessity for screening all the indications that each agency receives. I think if we do too much changing around we eliminate that. Now whether we want to eliminate that or not that is something else. Assuming that we do not, I think we should leave a. somewhat as we have modified it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Now when you say modified, how do you consider it as having been already modified?

MR. TRUEHEART: That is a good question.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, I believe if we approach it on that basis we are somewhat hasseling over words. As we modified, I would say, accept U. S.

TOP<sup>22</sup> SECRET

TOP SECRET

Government intelligence agencies, or the IAC, or anything of that nature.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I will buy U. S. Government instead of National or U. S., but I think IAC is a little too narrow there, and that is my only worry. I don't care how we word it as long as we don't narrow this thing down to simply what we get from a limited number. We want to open it up to receive the information from all possible sources.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Would you agree to an attempt to put that in another paragraph?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, as long as we leave this open here. This to me, the word "receive", just simply means that everything is received from everywhere, and I think it is highly desirable to make it clear that we expect to receive everything from everywhere. Now when you get into just exactly who provides it and exactly how it is received, that is different. We treat that below. Maybe we don't treat it well enough, but we treat it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't think I have gotten my thought -- the meaning of a. -- across.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, you have to me, and I agree in general with it, and, as a matter of fact, I think that the word "received" belongs in there, and I think that we ought to make that "all U. S. Government" but make it broad.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, but you see we are going to have representatives of the IAC agencies, and what we were trying to do here was to get a screening of all the indications that each agency received. Now when we go to the agencies outside IAC you introduce another thought here, another relationship, and that is why I suggest that we give some consideration to putting that in another paragraph.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I don't have any objection as long as you have it in there somewhere.

DR. REICHARDT: I think agreeing with General Willems to sort of reverse myself from earlier, we have to set up channels, and if we get into the field where we receive things, I mean where the Indications Center or the Watch Committee receives things, from all over, you are getting into too big not

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

only responsibility, but it is almost a control thing. The indications for the Watch Committee are capable of legally controlling.

GENERAL LEWIS: What you are saying though is that a. talks about more than receiving things from all possible sources, and generally it doesn't talk about any more.

DR. REICHARDT: Well --

GENERAL LEWIS: Go ahead.

DR. REICHARDT: I mean to me. You can interpret it by adding General Willems' "screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all IAC agencies for considerations relating to the Watch Committee function". Now that sets up your channels and your method of operation, and then if you expand that "received by" to "that the various IAC agencies receive under their various charters information from all commands". If you are worried about a delay in Message Centers, let us say SAC, AFOIN, to the Indications Center, then hit it from that angle of taking care of the possible delays rather than have the Center receive it directly from SAC.

MR. SHELDON: It seems to me we are mixing oranges and lemons here somewhat. Why isn't it quite obvious that those working in the Center must screen everything they receive? I think that is quite obvious that anything that comes in or they arrange to get they must screen, and that is all we would be saying if we cut out the words where the stuff came from. You then turn around in c. and put the burden of action through IAC channels on the members of the staff. It seems to me that that is fundamental. We don't have to say where the stuff is coming from.

COLONEL WALLACE: May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

MR. SHELDON: Certainly.

COLONEL WALLACE: Do we have any examples now or historical cases where the various other than IAC agencies have been sending information that came to their attention which they thought was of vital interest to the national security? Do they automatically now give it to CIA, for instance?

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MR. SHELDON: Yes, we get information from all kinds of non-IAC sources.

CAPTAIN ELLER: For instance, in the [REDACTED]

out, but it comes from one of the IAC --

TOP SECRET

COLONEL WALLACE: That would be covered here -- received by an IAC agency. We don't care how the IAC agencies get it, and they are our bosses and in turn would funnel it to the Indications Center.

MR. TRUEHEART: I dare say that the system whereby the IAC agencies tap all the information that other agencies receive that that system may leave something to be desired, but we can hardly expect the Watch Committee to remedy the situation. I think it is a tremendous job to tap the 75 agencies in Washington, or if that is all there are, and CIA has got a large organization in OCD, I think, trying to do it in part. We can't ask it. The Watch Committee can't conceivably do any more in that field than the agencies with their large staffs have been able to do.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, but in a. all we are saying is, "Look, you guys, we have to screen that stuff that you get." Why do we have to say where it comes from?

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't think we do.

MR. SHELDON: That is what I say. Why don't we eliminate where you get it from? All we are telling them, "Look, screen this stuff." In b. we tell them, "Look, get your evaluations out by coordination, but your own work, and by request to your own Agency," and in c. we tell them, "Look, arrange for this screening through your IAC channels." It seems to me in a. we simply don't need to say where the stuff comes from or it makes any difference. All we are telling these guys to do is to look. "Go ahead and screen this stuff; get busy on it."

GENERAL WILLEMS: But in a. we are not telling them or we didn't intend to tell them to screen just the take -- the day's take -- that came in there. It was our intention to try to tell them more than that, that they would screen all of the pertinent intelligence received by all of the agencies. You see, we are trying to push them out beyond the present sort of routine acceptance of functions where what comes in to the Watch Secretariat is screened. They look it over and work it over, but that is as far as they go. Now we were trying in this . . . whether we were right or not, I don't know, but this point is not quite clear. We were trying in this a. to push them

out a little bit more and give them a wider field than that.

CAPTAIN ELLER: General, could we accomplish that by, as we just mentioned here, "continually screen all pertinent IAC intelligence information for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission? This will be pursued on an aggressive determined basis to insure that it is not carried out in a perfunctory manner," or some phrases along that line? In other words, the concept or the difference in the two concepts is vast in my opinion because when you say "received by all IAC agencies" you are talking of thousands of pieces of paper daily.

MR. TRUEHEART: I wonder if there is a difference that doesn't go more deep than this. Are you thinking perhaps, General Willems, of the individuals who make up the Center and what they do while they are not at the Center, and you are talking about what they do while they are in the Center?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, there may be a little difference in concept there.

MR. TRUEHEART: Because certainly while they are sitting in the offices of the Center they can't be screening anything but what has been sent over there or what they brought over there. On the other hand I think it is inconceivable that these individuals can screen all the information that comes into their agencies.

GENERAL WILLEMS: We are not saying all information; we are saying all indications.

MR. TRUEHEART: All pertinent information; that means it has been screened before it gets there.

GENERAL WILLEMS: We expect each representative in each agency will arrange for that, isn't that right?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Suppose we do trim out all the other words than just the screening and go on for the moment, and then come back to this and see if we have adequately provided for that?

MR. SHELDON: That may not suit everybody around the table, I don't know. All I am trying to do is to make the basket into which people can dip reasonably

TOP SECRET

large, and then you set up the channels whereby through the IAC mechanism those baskets are sorted to produce the pertinent indicators. That is all I am trying to do, and we are having trouble with words, I guess. Isn't that your concept of how this thing should be tackled?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, except if you take that out I think it is a little bit naked without saying where are you going to get this stuff. Maybe not.

MR. SHELDON: Well, does anybody object to "by all U. S. intelligence agencies" which is an alternate suggestion?

COLONEL WALLACE: I think that one is too wide, sir.

MR. SHELDON: Well, if you leave the word "National" in and define it correctly it is certainly as broad as "U.S." isn't it?

COLONEL WALLACE: I think we ought to stick to the IAC agency wording which we were discussing sometime ago.

GENERAL LEWIS: I will buy IAC tentatively, and I don't entirely believe in it, but eventually I think I will be able to show you why.

MR. SHELDON: I would agree with you, Millard, on that. I would prefer to broaden it, but rather than hold up the parade here tentatively with a reservation, I will go along with it.

MR. TRUEHEART: I will go along with it, but above all solutions I would prefer leaving out everything from "received" through "agencies".

MR. SHELDON: Yes, I would agree with that too. Now I think we haven't any questions left open in b. Am I correct?

GENERAL LEWIS: Where do we stand now on a?

MR. SHELDON: Tentatively it reads as follows: Continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all IAC agencies for indications related to the Watch Committee mission. That is the tentative statement. b. at the moment reads: Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of all indications in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which an indication belongs. Are we temporarily satisfied with that?

MR. TRUEHEART: I think we could get around the grammatical problem we have had here by changing the "all" to "each" in the second line and going back to the "the" in the last line. Maybe that is polishing too much at

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

this point.

DR. REICHARDT: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: All right.

MR. TRUEHEART: Analysis of each indication.

MR. SHELDON: Now we get down to c. Now here we have a somewhat different problem. Here is your channeling problem, and it would seem to me that IAC is perhaps the appropriate change to be made for National because obviously you can't require the Indications Staff to deal outside the limits of the IAC.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I am going to add two bits more worth here, and I will buy IAC, but I can easily conceive of the fact that you might have a special individual in this Watch Center designated to maintain contact with everybody else, not only IAC, that you can possibly think of that might be a source of indications intelligence, and so I think we are still a little bit too narrow here to hold it to only IAC, and we said to arrange for. We didn't say order it. We said arrange for it, you see, but in order to get on, let's go ahead, but I still think that we have got an opportunity to pick up some bits and pieces, and I think we ought to take advantage of that opportunity somehow. I don't think you would necessarily do it through one of the IAC members either. You might do it direct, but you would do it either one way or the other whichever would be the most convenient.

MR. SHELDON: I can conceive of that occurring.

GENERAL LEWIS: It is a possibility, and you kind of hate to close the door, but the IAC is generally correct. It may be as much as 95% or 98% correct.

MR. SHELDON: If it became desirable to assign an individual on that basis it would seem to me quite possible to make such amendments as might be necessary in these papers to accommodate.

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think you would ever make any amendments in them. I think the thing to do . . . well, you might have trouble with them. I think the thing to do is to leave these slight loop holes to be able to do whatever is necessary to broaden . . . whatever is proper to broaden . . . it. It is

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

just absolutely impossible for us to sit here and draw sharp lines in these things without sharp lines and making them too limiting, and that is the thing that worries me about a number of these things. I think we are all generally talking about the same thing, but I would like to stay on the side of permitting a little bit of flexibility so that this thing can develop further when the time comes rather than to be limiting in the narrowest possible sense. Let's leave it at IAC for the moment.

MR. TRUEHEART: My general comment I would like to say that I don't want to limit these people's activities in the sense of preventing them from getting every scrap of information they need, but I am quite concerned that we can set up here another intelligence agency with all the paraphernalia going with it if we make the right kind of statements in these Terms of Reference.

GENERAL LEWIS: I just can't make myself worry about that in the least.

MR. SHELDON: I would agree with that, Millard. Besides we go on record here in our own notes to that effect that your asterisk is purposely intended to preclude any such procedure.

MR. TRUEHEART: How does it do that, Mr. Chairman? It says that it doesn't interfere with what anybody else wants to do.

MR. SHELDON: The intent, for instance, if you will refer to the Minutes of the 6th of October, to IAC, and General Cabell very specifically went on record as in guidance to this Committee and the operations of the Watch function to the effect that one thing we should be careful not to set up is a further intelligence agency, and there is no desire on anybody's part to do that.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am sure that isn't, but if that is the guidance we have received, I think we should do what we can to follow up on it by making sure that these Terms of Reference don't, in fact, create another intelligence agency.

MR. SHELDON: I have one query on c. That is the last three words. We could be absolutely specific if we said "as set forth in 2, a and b."

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: Or we could go back to the phrase in a. related to the Watch Committee mission.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, simply to tighten up. We are trying to make a definition here, and we might as well stick to the hard earned definitions in the paper. Is that agreeable to you?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Would you say it again?

MR. SHELDON: "Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth" or whatever words you want to use in C,2,a and b above.

COLONEL WALLACE: That would be just C,2 then would it not, sir?

MR. SHELDON: Correct.

MR. KUERTZ: While you are dealing with C,2, I thought we left it a while back at a meeting that 2 include a phrase here which I don't see in the revised copy you have distributed here, and that was "furnished by the IAC Agencies relating to imminence of hostilities." I thought we somewhat --

MR. SHELDON: That is an error because that was an agreed phrase.

MR. KUERTZ: I thought it was, and I don't see it.

MR. SHELDON: Frank, check that.

25X1A [REDACTED] I will check that, yes, sir.

MR. SHELDON: That was agreed to in the recent meeting. You are quite correct. Are there any other comments on c? Everybody is satisfied with c? Except Bill?

MR. TRUEHEART: Is everybody else satisfied?

MR. SHELDON: Let's have your thoughts on it. Come on; don't be bashful.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not, as you know. I just thought maybe somebody else would like to do a little talking here. I would be glad to hear any other comments first.

MR. KUERTZ: Well, I will have to see it work. I think it is entirely too broad, and just a literal reading of it there, I can't conceive of it, but I won't let that stand in the way of it by seeing it in writing there to see how it will work.

MR. TRUEHEART: One thing that just puzzles me a little is if in b. we have the Center asking the agencies for evaluations, and in c. we provide

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

that everything we send over there goes with an evaluation, it implies that it would be evaluated before it would be sent over. I think there is a fuzziness in these two paragraphs as to just what is going to happen here.

GENERAL WILLEMS: That is because you might get an indication reported by the Air Force, let us say, which might be actually better evaluated by a naval expert, and the thought there was that if the Navy could contribute anything to it or would be the appropriate Agency, it was the responsibility of the Working Group to get it to the Navy.

MR. TRUEHEART: So it would only be in the case where the information originated with an Agency which wasn't qualified to evaluate it that b. would be operated.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Not necessarily qualified.

MR. TRUEHEART: Best qualified, I mean as to responsibility of the Center here to insure the necessary . . . Do you expect all information furnished will be evaluated before it is sent to you, which is one way of reading c? I think that is probably not feasible, and if it is feasible, not desirable because of the time lag involved.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, it depends upon what you mean by evaluation. I mean if it is received by any intelligence agency it probably gets some evaluation in just being transmitted. Let's say even the very hot reports that we get in from the Air Force of planes that are not identified, etc., they always come in and there is some evaluation on them. By the time the people in the Watch or Duty Officer gets it, we have the benefit of the advice of someone from the Air Force.

COLONEL WALLACE: I believe it would be a mistake for the Indications Center to be getting a great mass of unevaluated or raw intelligence because they . . . On the other hand, in connection with this c. I can see receiving a piece of evaluated intelligence, and as a result of discussion within the Indications Center they might desire a clarification of a certain aspect of it and go back either to the originator, that is, the agency who sent the report or others if need be to get that clarification. I believe that was



~~TOP SECRET~~

the intent probably in that c., wasn't it, General?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't think c. means to prevent an agency from getting a flash over if it appeared that type of an indication.

DR. REICHARDT: I was just wondering if we could get some clarification in here by say renumbering these. That is, you have a., and then under a. number 1 which is presently c., and 2 which is presently b. with necessary modification. In other words, would it be somewhat --

GENERAL LEWIS: Or put a. as 2, and then b. But they receive which has not already been evaluated the follow-up. In other words, you start with arranging for these people to do the maximum, and then a screening what they do, but also screening anything else that they have received that they haven't evaluated, and then following that develop the evaluation of anything that hasn't already been evaluated.

DR. REICHARDT: I think that is probably the better arrangement of the thing.

GENERAL LEWIS: And I can conceive of in connection with the present b. here that there will be some simultaneous distribution, not very much, but there will be some, and that there will be a requirement for b. There will be some things coming in that would have to be evaluated by others or would have to be evaluated because it is a simultaneous distribution. Maybe they receive it from one service, as you said, and it is properly evaluated by another, and they don't have the evaluation at the moment, so they have to go after it.

MR. SHELDON: It does seem reasonably logical to start with c., doesn't it? The first thing they have to do when they set up business is arrange for the stuff to arrive, and the next thing to do is to treat with it and then follow-ups and coordination, etc. I think that is a reasonable --

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think that is a good suggestion.

DR. REICHARDT: I think that may answer a lot of the problems.

MR. SHELDON: Let's read it in that context if that is agreeable with you.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: c. becomes a.

DR. REICHARDT: c. becomes a., and a. becomes sub 1 and sub 2.

MR. TRUEHEART: Would there be any objection to changing that to say, "arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening" as opposed to "arranging for a systematic screening by all"? It seems a little less coercive if you put it that way.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I think that is quite proper.

MR. KUERTZ: "arrange with", Bill?

MR. TRUEHEART: "arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening."

MR. SHELDON: Don't you think you better leave the word "all" in there? "Arrange with all . . . "

MR. TRUEHEART: For IAC agencies read whatever is the going term.

COLONEL WALLACE: What is that going to be now? . . . "arrange with all . . . "?

MR. KUERTZ: You don't need "all IAC agencies" there, do you, the way you have transferred it? The "all" has to do with intelligence rather than IAC.

DR. REICHARDT: Right.

MR. SHELDON: It is "arrange with the IAC agencies -- ", isn't it?

MR. KUERTZ: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: " -- for a systematic screening of all intelligence information"? Do we need "by any means" in there? If we are going to arrange for the screening of all intelligence information it doesn't seem to me that we need to say any more.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, you were aiming there at insuring that an Agency didn't have the privilege of setting apart and saying, "this is something unusual that we are operating here, and we don't want to bring this into the Center." And when I say that I am not only thinking of just CIA with some of your operations.

MR. SHELDON: I withdraw the "by any means" if that is aimed at us, and it makes no difference to me.

GENERAL WILLEMS: We find the problem within the Army. Every once in awhile somebody is working on something that he thinks sets himself a little bit apart, and we are trying to emphasize that for all concerned, and it would be pointed at the Army intelligence as much as anybody else.

MR. TRUEHEART: Just an interjection. You certainly didn't draw these things up in haste. These are not the first words that came into your head. I am beginning to see that.

GENERAL WILLEMS: A lot of good thinking has gone into this by people who have been involved in this problem for some time.

COLONEL WALLACE: I was just thinking going back to one of the comments General Willems made a moment ago about a flash or hot item. It occurs to me that if there is such an item that is likely to lead to a special meeting of the Watch Committee anyway rather than be something that the Indications Center would get all stirred up about first. If in the mind of any one of the IAC members it was of that importance, he would probably call for that Watch Committee meeting on an emergency basis.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

COLONEL WALLACE: Did we agree that c. is now a.?

MR. SHELDON: We are looking at it in that context.

DR. REICHARDT: In this thing if we have c. as a., what do we do with the present 1 and 2?

GENERAL LEWIS: Make them b. and c.

DR. REICHARDT: b. and c.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think that would be better.

DR. REICHARDT: I think I have forgotten who raised the point earlier, but it was "promptly extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding" is perhaps too general, but not too general, but it covers too broad a field. It should only be done when pertinent to the particular agencies. We are losing something by leaving it as it is written is the way I feel.

CAPTAIN ELLER: He says, "indications of Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C,2 above." That limits it.

DR. REICHARDT: True, but you have there . . . you see "arrange with the IAC agencies for systematic screening of all intelligence information received by them by any means for the purpose of promptly extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding to the Indications Center all indications of Soviet/Communist intentions."

MR. TRUEHEART: Are you thinking of the overlap that might involve several agencies sending the same item?

DR. REICHARDT: No, I am not thinking of an overlap. I am just wondering if we . . . I mean by "extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding all indications" you have left no chance for an indication being held, you see, but when you get to the evaluating and analyzing, is there not there a chance for a member in one agency . . . ? I can well imagine where somewhere in our office could well miss something that would evaluate as not an indication that might well be an indication to military.

MR. SHELDON: I see; in other words, you would propose that . . .

DR. REICHARDT: At the same time we need an evaluation, you see, and I don't want to have that chance of missing anything.

MR. SHELDON: I think your point is well taken. There is that danger that the across the board look, which is one of the things we are trying to achieve here, wouldn't take place based on these words.

DR. REICHARDT: And yet I don't want to open it too broad because we don't want to have every piece of paper coming in come into the Center, but I just raise the point as something the Committee could consider while we are looking at this.

MR. SHELDON: What you want to get in the idea there is evaluating where it seems advisable, or otherwise forwarding if you really don't know, if you are on the fence about the thing, and to have somebody else take a good look at it.

DR. REICHARDT: That is right, and I mean maybe we can leave that implicit in the understanding or something, but perhaps we can choose some wording to cover that.

MR. SHELDON: I think that idea is valid.

TOP SECRET

DR. REICHARDT: Perhaps we could . . . well, we had the extracting and forwarding, and when possible accompanied by an evaluation and analysis. Would that serve the purpose, or would that be too limiting again the other way? I mean would it be too time consuming? There are two thoughts in that. There is another one which has occurred to me. Any evaluation and analysis takes time, and it defeats the promptness.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Would you excuse me if I left? I have an appointment, and I simply have to leave. Colonel Berry, if he could represent me here?

MR. TRUEHEART: Actually our time is about up anyway.

MR. SHELDON: I mean you are thinking along the lines of extracting and evaluating where appropriate and forwarding?

DR. REICHARDT: Something along that line to try to cover borderline cases.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is better because if you have to go through each of the four processes in each and every case you will get a time lag, and in certain instances you will not get the across the board look which is one of the objectives of the Indications Center.

DR. REICHARDT: If you don't do that, I mean present a. which is now b. might as well not be said.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that is a good thing.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is a good thought. You could simply say, "evaluating where appropriate and forwarding," leaving out analyzing. How does that hit the community?

COLONEL WALLACE: What words go in there now again, please?

MR. SHELDON: We are trying out for size "promptly extracting, evaluating when appropriate, and forwarding."

DR. REICHARDT: We are losing "analysis" in this case, and I am not so sure we need it.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that is part of evaluation.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

DR. REICHARDT: I think evaluation would be broad enough for what we want here.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. SHELDON: Does anybody object to that suggested change?

GENERAL LEWIS: Try it again.

MR. SHELDON: "promptly extracting, evaluating when appropriate, and forwarding to the Indications Center." It simply gives the originating agency the right to shove a piece of paper through when they are on the fence on it or don't have the time to actually produce an evaluation.

GENERAL LEWIS: You might help that a little bit by after Indications Center saying "all information which may contain indications of."

DR. REICHARDT: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, because if there is a gray area it may not be clearly cut as an indication.

MR. TRUEHEART: How does that read?

GENERAL LEWIS: After Indications Center say "all information which may contain indications of."

MR. SHELDON: I think that helps this.

MR. TRUEHEART: There is a problem of duplication here. Do we have to worry about that?

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you have to worry that it might not occur because I think it is inevitable, and I think unless you do have a little bit you are not likely to get every last piece of information that you want. In other words, there is no way you can cut a sharp line and absolutely cut out the duplication.

MR. TRUEHEART: I realize that, but when you get a . . . say NSA sends out an item -- a movement of troops. Do we look to G-2 to pass that to the Watch Committee, or is every agency which will have received this bulletin going to shoot it in? That is what I mean.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think it is a question of what kind of troops, and it might be all kinds of troops. You might get it from three different directions, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is an Infantry Division moving in Germany.

GENERAL LEWIS: You may not know whether it is Infantry. You may not know whether Air is connected with it; you may not know naval forces.

MR. TRUEHEART: This we do know. Everybody gets this bulletin. It

TOP SECRET

concerns the movement of an Infantry Division in Germany. Who sends it in to the Watch Committee -- everybody or just the Army?

GENERAL LEWIS: No, I think what you would do would be to look to see to be sure that the Army had received distribution of this particular item. If they had received distribution of it you would assume that they would report it, but it occurs sometimes the distribution may not have been made, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well --

GENERAL LEWIS: Then if you are not sure of the distribution you ought to maybe report it to the Army and maybe to the Center at the same time, depending on how hot it is. Normally you would send it to the Army.

MR. SHELDON: In practice what I am pretty sure our people would do they would call up G-2 and say, "Look, reference so and so, what action are you taking on this, and we have a question on that," and you have a literal day to day and hour to hour talk about these various things.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would think we didn't need to spell this out in this paragraph, but read literally it means everybody will shoot everything in even though you might know that the fellow down the street --

MR. SHELDON: In practice I don't think it will work that way. There would be an informal coordination as to who was carrying the ball on that, and then when it hit the Center, if it was a G-2 contribution, and the Air man sitting there, or the Navy body sitting there, says, "Gentlemen, we have something in the files here which may be on time pressure they have not taken into consideration," so they would go back to their headquarters and bring in another facet so that you would have a more rounded evaluation finally on the piece, or per contra G-2 before they shot the item in might send it into A-2 or ONI and get their particular viewpoint on the thing, and then it would hit the Center in a rounded pre-evaluated form, but I can conceive of either of two techniques being used.

COLONEL WALLACE: We even see that occurring in the Watch Committee itself where one member will speak up and say, "I have something; this is really an Army item, but are you going to mention it?" and the man will say,

"Yes" or "No", and then it will be dropped.

MR. SHELDON: I don't see much difficulty there, and you have to provide, as Millard says, for everybody to be thinking about the item, but usually only one person will carry the ball.

COLONEL BERRY: Don't you think, sir, it is much better to have the possibility of overlap than to have the possibility of a gap?

GENERAL LEWIS: That is the point I was making in the first place. It isn't that overlap that I worry about because I don't think there will be much. It is the possibility of the gap, and it has happened. I have actually had it happen where one activity receives a report and thinks that the other one who should have primary interest has it, and they didn't have it and hadn't received it yet.

COLONEL WALLACE: That was one of the lessons of the Pearl Harbor investigation. They laid down some 25 principles which Congress required be put in appropriate training manuals of the Services and haunted the schools, and came up with one I remember, "Never assume anything. If in doubt send it anyway just to be sure."

MR. SHELDON: Yes, our time seems to be up. Does that conclude the discussion on the new a.? Is everybody happy about the new a. now?

DR. REICHARDT: I would say pending any thoughts that come to one during the next week we might as well close it off.

MR. SHELDON: All right, fine. Thank you very much.

(There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting adjourned at 12:35 P.M.)